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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 980210-CA
vs.
Priority No. 2

RODGER VANCLEAVE,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
POINT I
VANCLEAVE DID NOT MAKE AN INTELLIGENT
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT FAILED TO ADVISE HIM OF THE DANGERS AND
DISADVANTAGES OF SELF-REPRESENTATION BEFORE IT
WAS DETERMINED THAT VANCLEAVE WOULD REPRESENT HIMSELF
Therightto counsel delineated in the Sixth Amendment is a fundamental right
which must be "jealously protected" and therefore, a "heavy burden" is placed upon the
trial judge to determine whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver of that right
by the accused. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917 (Utah 1998). In addition, there is "a
presumption against waiver, and doubts concerning waiver must be resolved in the
defendant's favor." Id. Furthermore, before a trial court may permit a criminal defendant
l

to proceed without the assistance of counsel, the court must thoroughly "advise the
defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation 'so that the record will
establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'"
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918 (citations omitted).
A thorough, on-the-record colloquy between the trial court and the defendant "is
the preferred method of determining the validity of a waiver of counsel." Heaton, 958
P.2d at 918 (citing State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987)). The State has
argued that Vancleave "concedes that the trial court engaged in a colloquy" and that
defendant's argument is that the colloquy was insufficient in an of itself to establish an
intelligent waiver of counsel (Br. of Appellee at 9). However, Vancleave has not—and
does not—concede that any such colloquy took place between the trial court and the
defendant. To the contrary on page 21 of appellant's brie£ Vancleave argues that
"although the trial court during the course of trial encouraged [defendant] to allow
[counsel] to represent him and imparted to him the wisdom of such a decision, the trial
court never engaged in a colloquy on the record with Vancleave that is similar to that set
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Frampton" Moreover, Vancleave has argued—and
argues here—that the trial court—at a minimum—failed to sufficiently inform him of the
"dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 919.
The State has argued that Vancleave was "well aware of the risks of selfrepresentation" because the trial court "admonished defendant that self-representation
was not a good idea" and because the trial court "told defendant that if he chose to
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proceed pro se, he would be the only spokesperson for the defense: he would call,
interrogate and cross examine witnesses" and offer opening and closing arguments (Br. of
Appellee at 12 (citing R. 363 at 14-16)). However, Vancleave asserts that merely
outlining how the trial would proceed should Vancleave represent himself is not the same
as ensuring that Vancleave appreciated the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding
without counsel. Moreover, the trial court's "cursory recommendation" that defendant
rely on counsel—and counsel's expertise and experience-does not equate to an adequate
awareness by the defendant of the risks of self-representation. See Beaton, 958 P.2d at
919.
In Heaton-as in this case-the trial court recommended during trial that defendant
allow stand-by counsel to cross examine the State's witnesses. Based on that
recommendation by the trial court the State argued on appeal that Heaton "should have
been aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." Heaton, 958 P.2d at
919. In relation to this assertion, the Utah Supreme Court stated "While the court's
advice was certainly appropriate, it addressed only one of the disadvantages of selfrepresentation-i.e., not having experience and expertise in cross examining witnesses."
Id.
More importantly in regards to the timing of the trial court's admonishment that
the defendant utilize defense counsel on cross examination, the Utah Supreme Court
stated that by the time the trial court made such an admonishment it "had already
determined that Heaton had decided to represent himself and that the trial court must
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determine whether a competent and intelligent waiver of counsel has occurred before it
"may permit a defendant to proceed pro se" and not after. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 919.
Accordingly, while Judge Davis may have recommended that Vancleave could "benefit"
from "having Mr. Stephen Killpack represent [him] as an attorney, both as to motions, as
to objections, as to cross examination", he did so at the end of the first day of trial and
during subsequent days of trial after a determination had been made that Vancleave
would represent himself (R. 363 at 225; 364 at 33-34).
In addition in this case, unlike the defendant in Heaton, Vancleave actually asked
the trial court about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation when he
inquired on the morning of trial—and before it was determined that he would proceed pro
se~as to what effect self-representation would have on his ability to appeal any
conviction (R. 363 at 15). However, instead of exercising his duty to inform and advise
Vancleave of the risks of proceeding pro se—such as the potential forfeiture of appellate
claims because of ignorance of the law and/or the rules of evidence and procedure—Judge
Davis refused to answer Vancleave's question indicating that the effect that selfrepresentation could have on appeal was "not for this court to determine" (R. 363 at 15).
Vancleave asserts that like the trial judge in Heaton, Judge Davis failed to advise
Vancleave of "the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" before it was
determined that Vancleave would represent himself. Therefore, this Court should
likewise hold that Vancleave "did not validly waive his right to counsel" and that he is
entitled to a new trial. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 919. Similarly this Court should hold
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that there are "no extraordinary circumstances in this case which would justify" this
Court's examining the record and making a de novo determination as to the constitutional
validity of Vancleave's waiver of the right to counsel. Id.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Because the trial court failed to advise Vancleave of the "dangers and
disadvantages" of self-representation and failed to ensure that Vancleave had an "actual
awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se'\ Vancleave asks that this Court reverse his
convictions and hold that his waiver of therightto counsel was not intelligently made.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^L day of November, 2000.
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